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ONEOK, INC. V. LEARJET, INC.: THE SUPREME COURT
NARROWS THE PREEMPTIVE SCOPE OF THE
NATURAL GAS ACT AND EXTRACTS A
WIN FOR STATE COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the primary sources of energy in the United States,
the transportation and sale of natural gas is a major concern for
both the federal and state governments.1 Consequently, all stages
of the production, transportation, and sale of natural gas are highly
regulated.2 Congress passed the Natural Gas Act (NGA) in order to
uniformly regulate the natural gas industry by separating the federal authority from state authority.3 Complications arise, however,
when courts are faced with determining whether federal authority
preempts the states’ authority pursuant to the NGA.4
The Supreme Court of the United States has reviewed this preemption issue a number of times, but most recently in ONEOK, Inc.
v. Learjet, Inc.5 during the October 2014 Term.6 The issue before
the Court in Oneok was whether, in some instances, both the federal
and state governments could regulate natural gas prices under the

1. See Cathryn Neaves, Note, Proper Legal Analysis, Improper Result: Recent History
of Judicial Preemption Interpretation of the Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act, 23
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 829, 829 (1989) (discussing importance of energy regulation).
For a discussion of the federal and state governments’ role in the natural gas industry, see infra notes 55-79 and accompanying text.
2. For a discussion of how the natural gas industry is regulated, see infra notes
55-79 and accompanying text.
3. See Neaves, supra note 1, at 829-30 (discussing purpose of NGA). For a
discussion of what the NGA generally provides, see infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
4. See Neaves, supra note 1, at 830 (stating existence of continuing issues despite line drawn by NGA). For a discussion of the issue before the Court in
ONEOK and how the Court resolved it, see infra notes 100-133 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Court’s precedent regarding the NGA, see infra notes
80-95.
5. 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015).
6. For a discussion of the Court’s precedent regarding the NGA, see infra
notes 80-95 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the underlying facts in
ONEOK, see infra notes 15-39.
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NGA.7 The Court ultimately allowed concurrent regulation to occur, thus weakening the preemptive scope of the NGA.8
First, this Note considers the underlying facts and procedural
history in ONEOK.9 Second, this Note examines the background of
the Supremacy Clause, the NGA, and the Supreme Court’s precedent interpreting the NGA’s preemptive scope.10 Third, this Note
examines Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, and Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.11 Fourth,
this Note critically analyzes both the majority and dissenting opinions in relation to the precedent regarding the NGA.12 Through
this analytical comparison, this Note concludes that the majority’s
holding runs contrary to the Court’s precedent.13 Lastly, this Note
determines what impact the Court’s decision in ONEOK will likely
have on the natural gas industry.14
II. FACTS
ONEOK originated from a number of civil actions brought in
federal and state courts alleging antitrust violations by interstate
pipeline companies selling natural gas.15 By the time the matter
reached the Supreme Court, the Court had to determine whether
the plaintiffs could bring state antitrust claims when the interstate
pipeline companies’ alleged actions had an effect on rates within
the federal government’s jurisdiction.16 Accordingly, the Court
7. See Neaves, supra note 1, at 830 (explaining issues persist despite clear line
drawn by NGA). For a discussion of the issue confronting the Court in ONEOK,
see infra notes 15-39 and accompanying text.
8. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1594 (holding state antitrust claims are not preempted by NGA even when alleged practices impact matters within federal jurisdiction). For a discussion of the majority’s opinion, see infra notes 100-133 and
accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of ONEOK’s facts, see infra notes 15-39 and accompanying
text.
10. For a discussion of the necessary background information to the Court’s
opinion in ONEOK, see infra notes 40-95 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in
ONEOK, see infra notes 100-156 and accompanying text.
12. For a critical analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions, see infra
notes 157-187 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of why the majority’s opinion is inconsistent with the
Court’s precedent, see infra notes 157-187 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of ONEOK’s impact on natural gas regulation, see infra
notes 188-212 and accompanying text.
15. See In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716,
727-28 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining procedural history of ONEOK), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom., ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015).
16. See ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (2015) (stating
issue confronting Court).
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had to once again assess the preemptive scope of the NGA more
than three-quarters of a century after the act was passed.17
The civil actions brought against various interstate pipeline
companies were a result of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) investigation following the 2000-2002 energy crisis.18
This investigation uncovered reports of false information included
in price indices, as well as wash sales, causing massive price increases.19 As a result of these discovered practices, FERC and Congress took regulatory measures, while private consumers responded
with litigation.20
The consumers that brought claims against interstate pipelines
in federal and state courts across the nation were direct purchasers
of natural gas from interstate pipeline companies.21 In early suits,
defendant-pipeline companies claimed that the plaintiffs’ claims
were barred by the filed-rate doctrine.22 “The filed-rate doctrine ‘is
a judicial creation that arises from decisions interpreting federal
statutes that give federal agencies exclusive jurisdiction to set rates
for special utilities’ and bars ‘challenges under state law and federal
antitrust laws to rates set by federal agencies.’”23 The district courts
17. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the preemptive scope of the NGA, see infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
18. See Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d at 724 (explaining events leading
to litigation against interstate pipelines). Through these investigations, FERC
found that “[s]pot gas prices rose to extraordinary levels, facilitating the unprecedented price increase in the electricity market.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). For a further discussion of this investigation and its impacts, see infra
notes 73-79 and accompanying text. FERC is the government agency authorized to
set rates for sales within the federal government’s jurisdiction under the NGA. See
ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1596. FERC was formally known as the Federal Power Commission (FPC). See id. For a further discussion of FERC’s background and the
delineation of jurisdiction over the natural gas industry, see infra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text.
19. See Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d at 724-25 (detailing FERC’s discoveries of improper practices by traders). Wash sales are “prearranged sales in which
traders ‘agreed to execute a buy or a sell on an electronic trading platform . . . and
then to immediately reverse or offset the first trade by bilaterally executing over
the telephone an equal and opposite buy or sell.’ ” Id. at 725. For a further discussion of how wholesale rates are established and FERC’s discovery regarding that
method, see infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of FERC and Congress’s response, see infra notes 75-79
and accompanying text.
21. See Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d at 727 (describing various class
actions against interstate pipelines). “Two of the earliest cases . . . alleged both
Sherman Act and parallel state antitrust claims.” Id. (citations omitted).
22. See id. (providing procedural history of earliest cases in antitrust class actions against interstate pipelines).
23. See id. at 727 n.8 (citing E. & J. Gallo Winery v. EnCana Corp., 503 F.3d
1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2007)) (defining filed-rate doctrine). Therefore, under this
doctrine, courts are not allowed to assess what rates are reasonable because FERC

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016

3

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7

364 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII: p. 361
in these earlier cases used this doctrine to dispose of state antitrust
claims, but refrained from answering the presented preemption
questions.24 In an unrelated case involving similar facts, however,
the Ninth Circuit invalidated the use of the filed-rate doctrine in
this context.25
The interstate pipeline-defendants successfully removed and
consolidated subsequent class actions for alleged price manipulation into a multi-district litigation (MDL) in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.26 The defendants filed
motions for summary judgment, arguing that FERC had jurisdiction because the alleged practices also impacted interstate rates for
natural gas.27 Under this argument, the defendants claimed that
the NGA preempted the state antitrust claims.28
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.29 The court based its reasoning on the word “practices” in the NGA.30 The court found that because the defendants’
alleged practices affected rates within FERC’s jurisdiction, FERC’s
authority preempted that of the states.31
The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing that the district court erroneously granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment.32 The appellate court reversed the
lower court’s decision, and held that the NGA did not preempt the
has exclusive jurisdiction over determining what rates are reasonable. See TexasOhio, Inc. v. Centerpoint Energy, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114-15 (D. Nev.
2005).
24. See Texas-Ohio, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (stating filed-rate doctrine bars
plaintiffs’ claims).
25. See E. & J. Gallo Winery, 503 F.3d at 1048 (holding filed-rate doctrine does
not bar state or federal antitrust claims).
26. See Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d at 727 (detailing removal and consolidation of class actions against pipelines).
27. See In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 2:03-CV-1431PMP-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83062, at *47-48 (D. Nev. July 18, 2011) (stating
grounds for defendants’ motion for summary judgment).
28. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1598 (explaining defendants’ preemption
argument).
29. See Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83062, at *108
(granting defendants’ motion).
30. See id. at *100 (focusing on practices leading to energy crisis). “[T]he
term ‘practices’ is ‘limited to those methods or ways of doing things on the part of
the [natural gas company] that directly affect the rate or are closely related to the
rate, not all those remote things beyond the rate structure that might in some
sense indirectly or ultimately do so.’ ” Id. at *92 (quoting Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator
Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 372 F.3d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
31. See id. at *103-04 (stating FERC maintains jurisdiction since alleged practices affected rates within their jurisdiction).
32. See Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d at 728 (stating grounds for
appeal).
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state law claims.33 The appellate court found the district court’s
interpretation of the NGA and FERC’s jurisdiction overly expansive.34 The court found that Congress intended to give FERC only
limited jurisdiction when it passed the NGA.35 Further, the court
held that the claims were outside FERC’s jurisdiction because the
claims pertained to direct, rather than wholesale, sales.36 The court
further reasoned that the state law claims were not preempted because the relevant transactions were within the jurisdiction of the
states.37 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, ultimately held that it was
improper for the district court to grant summary judgment.38 The
defendants subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and the Court granted certiorari.39
III. BACKGROUND
First, this section of the Note examines the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution, as well as preemption of state law
by federal law.40 Second, this section details the history of the natural gas industry in the United States.41 Third, this section explains a
number of Supreme Court cases examining the scope of the NGA’s
preemptive effect on state regulation over the natural gas
industry.42

33. See id. at 729 (reversing district court’s ruling).
34. See id. (holding district court’s reading of NGA to be contrary to Congress’s intent).
35. See id. (citing Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind.,
332 U.S. 507, 516 (1947)) (stating NGA only grants limited jurisdiction to FERC).
36. See id. at 731 (finding transactions at issue to be outside of FERC’s
jurisdiction).
37. See Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d at 731 (holding claims to be properly within states’ jurisdiction).
38. See id. at 747 (reversing District Court of Nevada’s grant of summary
judgment).
39. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599 (granting certiorari in order to settle dispute amongst lower courts over preemptive scope of NGA). “The pipelines. . . .
asked us to resolve confusion in the lower courts as to whether the Natural Gas Act
pre-empts retail customers’ state antitrust law challenges to practices that also affect wholesale rates.” Id. (differentiating Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d at
729-36, from Leggett v. Duke Energy Corp., 308 S.W.3d 843 (Tenn. 2010)).
40. For a discussion of how federal law preempts state law in some instances,
see infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
41. For a history of the natural gas industry, see infra notes 55-79 and accompanying text.
42. For a discussion of the Court’s precedent regarding the NGA, see infra
notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
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A. The Supremacy Clause and Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that federal law is always supreme to state and local laws.43
The legal authority of the states, however, is far from obsolete.44
This dual regulatory authority is often a conductor for extensive
constitutional debate.45
Congress can preempt state laws either expressly or implic46
itly. State laws are expressly preempted when a federal statute is
drafted with a provision excluding states from regulating a particular area covered by the federal statute.47 Despite clear congressional intent in these instances, the Supreme Court has held
consistently that courts should “apply some version of a presumption against preemption.”48
Contrastingly, courts may find federal law to preempt state law
without the express will of Congress.49 Federal law may implicitly
preempt law in two ways: through field preemption or through conflict preemption.50 Field preemption occurs when a state law is preempted from regulating a particular “field” that the federal
government is already regulating.51 Conflict preemption applies
when federal and state law conflict to such an extent as to make it
impossible to comply with both.52 Federal law preempts state or
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating general constitutional principle that federal law trumps state law). More specifically, the clause states, “[t]his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Id.
44. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 (2000) (emphasizing
that state governments maintain authority over many areas of law also regulated by
federal government).
45. See id. (stating importance of relationship between federal and state law).
46. See id. at 225-29 (explaining different types of preemption).
47. See ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015) (defining
express preemption).
48. Nelson, supra note 44, at 227 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S.
504, 516, 518 (1992); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (providing that courts narrowly read express preemption clauses).
49. See id. (stating courts may infer Congress’s intent to preempt state law).
“[A] federal regulatory scheme may be ‘so pervasive’ as to imply ‘that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it.’ ” Id. (citing English v. General Elec. Co.,
496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
50. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595 (reviewing sub-sets of implicit preemption).
51. See id. (stating states may not regulate same field as federal law). “[T]he
‘federal interest’ in the field that a federal statute addresses may be ‘so dominant’
that federal law ‘will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject.’ ” Nelson, supra note 44, at 227 (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
52. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595 (citing California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490
U.S. 93, 100, 101 (1989)) (describing two ways in which conflict preemption
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local law under either theory of implied preemption.53 Due to the
interstate nature of the natural gas industry, therefore, complex
preemption issues tend to arise.54
B. The Natural Gas Industry in the United States and
(De)regulation
The natural gas industry has three distinct components: natural gas extraction from the ground, wholesale transactions by interstate pipelines to distributors, and natural gas distributor retail
sales.55 States were originally the sole regulatory bodies controlling
all three components of the natural gas industry.56 By the twentieth
century, however, the Supreme Court held that the Commerce
Clause prevented states from regulating the interstate shipment
and sale of natural gas.57 Then, in 1938, Congress passed the NGA,
which granted power to the federal government to regulate interstate sales and other related activities.58
The NGA “gives rate-setting authority to [FERC].”59 It limits
this authority, however, to the rates of natural gas being transarises); see also Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 373-77
(1988) (holding state inquiry into FERC’s determination of fair and reasonable
rates because of highly probable potential for conflict); Fed. Power Comm’n v. La.
Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 633-35 (1972) (holding state regulation is preempted because of “unavoidable conflict” with federal regulation).
53. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595 (stating ways state law may be preempted by
federal law).
54. See id. at 1601 (stating that there is no clear line between state and federal
law in natural gas industry). But see id. at 1607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986)) (stating
Congress intended for there to be clear line between federal and state power over
natural gas industry).
55. See id. at 1603-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (detailing primary components of
natural gas industry).
56. See id. at 1595 (citing 1 Regulation of the Natural Gas Industry § 1.03 W.
Mogel ed. 2008)) (stating origins of jurisdiction over natural gas industry).
57. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595 (citing Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927); Mo. ex rel. Barrett v. Kan.
Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1924)) (explaining limitations on state regulatory power over natural gas industry). Under the Commerce Clause, the power
to regulate commerce between states is given to the federal government. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
58. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1596 (citations omitted) (introducing federal
regulation of natural gas industry); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2012) (giving federal
jurisdiction over interstate sales of natural gas).
59. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1596 (explaining power held by FERC under
NGA). “That authority allows FERC to determine whether ‘any rate, charge, or
classification . . . collected by any natural-gas company in connection with any
transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of [FERC],’ or ‘any rule,
regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is un-
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ported and sold in interstate commerce.60 States, therefore, are left
to regulate intrastate transportation, retail sales, and the production or gathering of natural gas.61
The federal government’s rate-setting method for interstate
sales has changed over time, emphasizing its push towards deregulation of the natural gas industry.62 Initially, FERC determined
rates according to the costs interstate pipelines put into providing
their services.63 In the 1954, however, the Supreme Court held in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin64 that “the [NGA] required regulation of prices at the interstate pipelines’ buying end-i.e., the prices at
which field producers sold natural gas to interstate pipelines.”65 By
the 1970s, natural gas shortages led Congress to favor “deregulation
designed to rely upon competition, rather than regulation, to keep
field prices low.”66 FERC thereafter followed Congress’s intent and
implemented less strict regulation emphasizing competition.67
Under this system, FERC issued blanket certificates that allowed interstate sellers, otherwise known as jurisdictional sellers, “to charge
market-based rates for gas, provided that FERC had first determined that sellers lacked market power.”68 As a result of deregulation, many natural gas consumers chose to buy their supply directly
just, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a)).
60. See id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)) (stating limitations of FERC’s jurisdiction). Specifically, FERC’s jurisdiction is limited to “the transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce,” “the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for
resale,” and “natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale.” 15
U.S.C. § 717(b).
61. See Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493,
507 (1989) (stating what jurisdiction NGA maintains for states to regulate).
62. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1596-97 (detailing rate-setting authority of FERC
over time).
63. See id. at 1596 (citing FERC, Cost-of-Service Rates Manual 6 (June 1999))
(explaining FERC’s “cost-of-service” method of setting interstate rates).
64. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
65. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1596 (alterations in original) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co., 347 U.S. at 682, 685) (noting shift in federal regulation over natural gas).
66. Id. at 1597 (citing Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3409 (codified
in part at 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (2015)); Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989,
Pub L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157) (introducing concept of deregulation of natural
gas industry).
67. See id. (stating FERC’s change in how it regulated interstate rates).
“FERC’s oversight of the natural-gas market largely consisted of (1) ex ante examinations of jurisdictional sellers’ market power, and (2) the availability of a complaint process under § 717(d)(a).” Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae at 4, ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015) (No. 13-271)).
68. Id. (citing Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol; Order Denying Rehearing and Clarifying Order Nos. 636 and 636-A, 57
Fed. Reg. 57957, 57957-58 (Aug. 3, 1992)) (detailing issuances of blanket certificates to jurisdictional sellers).
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from interstate pipelines for their own consumption, rather than
from distributors.69
Deregulation, however, was not without its flaws.70 The consumers who directly bought their supply of natural gas from interstate pipelines relied on private indices to determine reasonable
prices for natural gas.71 These indices were based on information
provided by natural gas sellers, such as interstate pipelines.72 In
2003, FERC discovered that false information was being provided to
these indices, causing prices to skyrocket.73 These practices impacted not only federally controlled wholesale rates, but also retail
rates, which are left to the states.74
In response to these discoveries, FERC issued a Code of Conduct, which prohibited blanket certificates to interstate sellers “engaging in actions without a legitimate business purpose that
manipulate or attempt to manipulate market conditions, including
wash trades and collusion.”75 FERC also responded by establishing
a policy on publishing and reporting information to private indices.76 Further, FERC terminated blanket certificates given to those
they discovered were engaged in wash trades.77 Congress re-

69. See id. (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 284 (1997)) (explaining impact deregulation had on natural gas consumption). In fact, the plaintiffs who brought lawsuits leading up to ONEOK directly bought their natural gas
from interstate pipelines. See id. at 1594.
70. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1597-98 (discussing issues with deregulation of
natural gas industry).
71. See id. at 1597 (explaining method by which natural gas consumers determined what rates were reasonable).
72. See id. (stating how private indices obtain data).
73. See id. (citing Final Report on Price Manipulation in Western Markets, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N 88, 89 (Mar. 2003), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/majord-reg/land-docs/PART-I-3-26-03.pdf) (detailing false reporting to private indices). FERC discovered practices involving false information included fabrications
of data and wash sales. Id. (citing Final Report on Price Manipulation in Western Markets, supra note 73, at 215). For a discussion of FERC’s discoveries and the definition of wash sale, see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
74. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1597 (quoting Final Report on Price Manipulation in
Western Markets, supra note 73, at 85-86) (explaining impact of false information
practices on interstate and intrastate sales).
75. Amendments to Blank Certificate Sales, 68 Fed. Reg. 66323-01, 66324
(Nov. 26, 2003) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R pt. 284) (amending process by which
blanket certificates are granted to jurisdictional sellers). FERC also required “accurate and factual information” be provided to the private indices. Id. at 66337.
76. See Price Discovery in Natural Gas and Elec. Mkts., 104 FERC ¶ 61,121, 61,40708 (2003) (setting forth policy guidelines regarding private indices).
77. See Enron Power Mktg., Inc., 103 FERC ¶ 61,343, 62,303 (2003) (terminating blanket certificates to certain interstate sellers).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016

9

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7

370 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII: p. 361
sponded by passing the Energy Policy Act of 2005,78 which increased FERC’s ability to prevent price manipulation and other
practices negatively impacting the services within FERC’s
jurisdiction.79
C. Courts’ Interpretation of the Preemptive Scope of the
Natural Gas Act
The Supreme Court of the United States has debated the preemptive scope of the NGA for decades.80 One of the earliest cases
was Public Utilities Commission of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co.,81 which
the Court decided just after the inception of the NGA.82 In that
case, the Court examined the legislative history of the Act and
found that it was “meant to create a comprehensive scheme of regulation which would be complementary in its operation to that of the
states.”83 The Court further noted Congress’s intent for there to be
a “harmonious, dual system of regulation of the natural gas industry” by both the federal and state governments.84
This principle of harmonious regulation becomes complicated, however, when particular practices affect both the interstate
and intrastate levels of the natural gas industry.85 For example, subsequent cases established that the federal government could regulate interstate wholesale transactions even if the federal
government knowingly impacted intrastate prices.86 As the Court
would discuss in ONEOK, however, it is questionable whether states
78. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (providing
FERC with greater regulatory abilities).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2012) (allowing FERC to promulgate rules and
order targeting price manipulation).
80. For more information on the Supreme Court’s stance on the preemptive
scope of the NGA, see infra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
81. 317 U.S. 456 (1942).
82. See id. 460-61 (stating how NGA was passed during litigation process).
83. Id. at 467 (establishing legislative intent of NGA).
84. Id. (making claim for harmonious regulation). “Neither state nor federal
regulatory body was to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the other.” Fed. Power
Comm’n v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 513 (1949) (describing delineation of authority between state and federal governments under NGA).
85. For a discussion of how the complications associated with “harmonious
regulation” arise, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
86. See Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 581, 602-03
(1945) (ruling FPC may set wholesale rates encouraging conservation from natural
gas producers); see also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 276-80
(1976) (holding FPC may regulate interstate sales in order to simmer anticompetitive activities in retail market). But see Scneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S.
293, 308 n.11 (1988) (stating NGA does not preempt traditional areas of state
regulation).
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can regulate areas that impact interstate sales.87 It must be determined, therefore, whether the line separating federal and state authority is clear and distinct or unclear and therefore subject to caseby-case determinations.88
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Commission of Kansas89
and Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Commission of Kansas90 were two important cases wherein the Court examined state
regulation to determine whether or not federal law preempted it.91
In Northern Natural Gas Co., the state regulatory commission’s order
required interstate pipelines to purchase their supply from wells located within the state at rates established by the state.92 The Court
invalidated the state orders, holding that they “necessarily deal[t]
with matters which directly affect[ed] the ability of the [FPC] to
regulate comprehensively and effectively the transportation and
sale of natural gas, and to achieve the uniformity of regulation
which was an objective of the [NGA].”93 In Northwest Central Pipeline
Corp., however, the Court upheld a state regulation restricting when
producers may extract gas because the activity being regulated was
“the physical act[ ] of drawing gas from the earth,” an activity
within states’ jurisdiction.94 Both of these cases were central to the
dispute before the Court in ONEOK: whether courts searching for

87. For a discussion of how this complicated issue arose, see supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
88. See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986)
(quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964))
(describing existence of bright line separating state and federal jurisdiction over
natural gas regulation).
89. 372 U.S. 84 (1962).
90. 489 U.S. 493 (1989).
91. For a discussion of the Court’s analyses of these cases, see infra notes 112114 and accompanying text. To see how the dissent’s interpretation differed, see
infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
92. See N. Natural Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 88-89 (providing factual background of
dispute between interstate sellers and state commission).
93. Id. at 91-92 (holding state order impeded on FPC’s jurisdiction and was
therefore preempted). In a similar case, the Supreme Court invalidated a state’s
requirement that pipelines obtain state approval before issuing stocks by holding
that the requirement was a direct regulation of interstate activities. See
Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 306-09.
94. Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp., 489 U.S. at 510 (quoting N. Natural Gas Co., 372
U.S. at 90) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding state regulation is not
preempted). In ruling, the Supreme Court has stated that “our cases have consistently recognized a significant distinction . . . between conservation measures aimed
directly at interstate purchasers and wholesales . . . and those aimed at producers
and production.” N. Natural Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 94.
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preemption should examine what the state is regulating or why the
state is regulating it.95
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
This section of the Note examines the three opinions in
ONEOK.96 First, it discusses Justice Breyer’s majority opinion ruling
in favor of the respondents.97 Second, this section looks at Justice
Thomas’s brief concurring opinion.98 Finally, this section explores
Justice Scalia’s dissent.99
A. Justice Breyer’s Majority Opinion
Justice Breyer began his analysis by limiting the scope by which
the Court could assess the petitioners’ claims.100 The petitioners
argued that “Congress implicitly occupied the field of matters related
to wholesale transactions and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce,” therefore, the Court limited its review to deciding
whether there was field preemption.101 The Court, thus, refrained
from examining whether the state antitrust claims were preempted
because they conflicted, or would possibly conflict with, the
NGA.102
Because the alleged activities had an effect on both wholesale
and retail rates, the petitioners argued that the state claims invaded
a field already being regulated by the federal government.103 Further, the petitioners argued that, “letting these actions proceed
95. For a discussion of how the majority uses these two cases, see infra notes
110-111 and accompanying test. To see how the dissenting opinion contrarily
looks at these cases, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
96. For a discussion of the opinions in ONEOK, see infra notes 100-156 and
accompanying text.
97. For a discussion of the majority’s opinion, see infra notes 100-133 and
accompanying text.
98. For a discussion of the concurring opinion, see infra notes 134-137 and
accompanying text.
99. For a discussion of the dissenting opinion, see infra notes 138-156 and
accompanying text.
100. See ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015) (limiting
review to whether there was field preemption).
101. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (excluding review of explicit or conflict preemption regarding state antitrust claims).
102. For a definition of conflict preemption, see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
103. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595 (citation omitted) (citing Brief for Petitioners at 18, ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015) (No. 13-271))
(detailing argument by petitioners that state claims are preempted because alleged
practices impacted matters with FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction).
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w[ould] permit state antitrust courts to reach conclusions about
that conduct that differ from those that FERC might reach or has
already reached.”104
The Supreme Court rejected all of the petitioners’ arguments.105 In doing so, the Court emphasized that the NGA was not
passed to decrease the regulatory power of the states.106 Further,
contrary to the petitioners’ arguments and Justice Scalia’s dissent,
the Court stated that there was no “clear division between areas of
state and federal authority in natural-gas regulation.”107 According
to the Court, accepting the petitioners’ argument would essentially
nullify state regulatory authority.108 Under the Court’s reasoning, if
states were unable to regulate activity because it would have an impact on rates regulated by the federal government, they would not
be able to regulate the natural gas industry at all.109
In establishing a test for determining when federal law
preempts state law, the Court stated that “precedent[ ] emphasiz[ed] the importance of considering the target at which the
state law aims in determining whether the law is pre-empted.”110
The Court, therefore, distinguished between two situations: the
state aiming regulations directly at an area primarily in the jurisdiction of the federal government and the state aiming its power at

104. Id. at 1599 (providing petitioners’ argument that upholding state law
claims will impact uniform natural gas regulation).
105. See id. (rejecting petitioners’ conclusions despite having “forceful”
arguments).
106. See id. (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
Ind., 332 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1947)) (clarifying that NGA does not weaken power of
states). The Supreme Court held that “the [NGA] ‘was drawn with meticulous
regard for the continued exercise of state power, not to handicap or dilute it in
any way.’ ” Id. (quoting Panhandle, 332 U.S. at 517-18). Therefore, the Court gave
the matter more detailed, cautious review in order to not violate states’ authority
under the NGA. Id.
107. Id. at 1601 (noting lack of clear distinction between federal and state
jurisdiction over natural gas industry). The majority stated, “that Platonic ideal
does not describe the natural gas regulatory world.” Id.
108. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1601 (quoting Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State
Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 514 (1989)) (stating implications of petitioners’ argument). The Court hypothesized that, “[s]uppose FERC . . . had denied
cost recovery for pipelines’ failure to recycle. Would that fact deny States the
power to enact and apply recycling laws? These state laws might well raise pipelines’ operating costs, and thus the costs of wholesale natural gas transportation.”
Id.
109. See id. (describing impact on state regulation if states could not regulate
areas affecting wholesale natural gas rates).
110. Id. at 1599 (emphasis in original) (establishing field preemption test).
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activities within its own jurisdiction.111 The Court used the regulation at issue in Northwest Central Pipeline Corp., where the state regulated “the timing of gas production from a gas field within the
State, even though the regulation might have affected the costs of
and the prices of interstate wholesale sales,” in order to highlight
the mechanics of this test.112 By contrast, in Northern Natural Gas
Co., because state regulations were “directed at purchasers,” rather
than producers, the Court found that field preemption was triggered.113 In the case at issue, the Court stated that the state antitrust claims were directed at practices related to their effects on
retail rates, and thus more in line with Northwest Central Pipeline
Corp., rather than with Northern Natural Gas Co.114
The Supreme Court further distinguished the state antitrust
claims from Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.,115 where the state required interstate pipelines to obtain state approval prior to issuing
securities.116 Schneidewind, therefore, aligned more with Northern
Natural Gas Co. because the state attempted to directly regulate the
rates of interstate pipelines.117
The Court then clarified its “target” test.118 According to the
Court, “the ‘target’ to which our cases refer must mean more than
just the physical activity that a State regulates.”119 Thus, if the test
were merely looking at the physical activity being regulated, the fed111. See id. (quoting N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 372
U.S. 84, 94 (1963)) (stating importance of what state seeks to regulate in finding
existence of preemption).
112. See id. at 1600 (citing Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp., 489 U.S. at 514) (providing
example of how field preemption test works).
113. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1600 (citing N. Natural Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 92)
(distinguishing Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. from Northern Natural Gas Co. based
on target of state regulation).
114. See id. (stating that state antitrust claims are not directly aimed at wholesale rates). For a discussion of Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. and Northern Natural
Gas Co., see supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
115. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1987).
116. See id. at 306-09 (stating state regulation interferes with field left for federal government to regulate).
117. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1600 (distinguishing state regulation at issue
from state regulation in Schneidewind). The Court stated, “[i]ndeed, the Court [in
Shneidewind] expressly said that the state law was pre-empted because it was ‘directed
at . . . the control of rates and facilities of natural gas companies,’ ‘precisely the
things over which FERC has comprehensive authority.’ ” Id. (emphasis in original)
(quoting Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 308).
118. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s criticism of the majority’s test, see infra
notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
119. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1600 (clarifying test does not just refer to physical
activity being regulated).
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eral government would have authority over all activities impacting
wholesale rates.120
Justice Breyer then attempted to rebut the dissent’s test for
field preemption.121 Under the dissenting opinion’s test, state law
is preempted whenever it attempts to regulate what the federal government is already regulating.122 In order to rebut this, the Court
looked to Schneidewind, where the Court held “that the Natural Gas
Act does not pre-empt ‘traditional’ state regulation, such as state
blue sky laws (which, of course, raise wholesale—as well as retail—
investment costs).”123 The Court, therefore, drew comparisons between antitrust laws and blue-sky laws, stating that neither is “aimed
at natural-gas companies in particular, but rather all businesses in
the marketplace.”124 Further, “[s]tates have a ‘long history of’ providing ‘common-law and statutory remedies against monopolies
and unfair business practices.’”125 According to the Court, the
broad applicability of antitrust claims and states’ history in regulating antitrust matters prevented the NGA from preempting the state
law claims.126
The Supreme Court further examined two cases that the petitioners pointed to in support of their argument.127 The Court,
noted, however, that both cases involved conflict preemption,

120. See id. (reemphasizing implications of preempting state claims just because practices also affect wholesale rates). “After all, a single physical action . . .
could be the subject of many different laws. . . . [N]o one could claim that FERC’s
regulation of this physical activity for purposes of wholesale rates forecloses every
other form of state regulation that affects those rates.” Id.
121. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s test, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
122. For a discussion of the dissent’s test, see infra text accompanying note
142.
123. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1600 (citing Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 308 n.11)
(clarifying Court’s holding in Schneidewind).
124. Id. (citing Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 308 n.11) (drawing comparisons between antitrust laws and blue sky laws).
125. Id. (quoting Cal. v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989)) (noting
states’ long antitrust regulation history).
126. See id. at 1601 (adopting broad application of antitrust claims preventing
preemption of state claims). According to the Court, “[t]hey are far broader in
their application than, for example, the regulations at issue in Northern Natural Gas
Co., which applied only to entities buying gas from fields within the State.” Id.
(citing N. Natural Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 85-86) (distinguishing antitrust claims from
state regulation at issue in Northern Natural Gas Co.).
127. See id. (stating petitioners claimed two additional cases purportedly in
support of their position). The two cases petitioners asserted were Mississippi Power
& Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore and Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co. Id.
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rather than field preemption.128 The Court, therefore, rejected the
petitioners’ argument under both of these cases because it had limited its review to field preemption.129 Rather, the Court left it to
the lower courts to decide whether conflict preemption can potentially apply under similar circumstances.130
Finally, the Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that it
should defer to FERC in finding that the NGA preempts state antitrust claims.131 The Court stated that petitioners failed to “point to
a specific FERC determination that state antitrust claims fall within
the field pre-empted by the Natural Gas Act.”132 Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and held that
the NGA did not preempt the state antitrust claims.133
B. Justice Thomas’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment to express
his view that implied preemption is unconstitutional.134 According
to Justice Thomas, federal laws are only supreme to state and local
law if they fall within one of the powers expressly given to Congress
128. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1601 (distinguishing cases pointed to by petitioners). In Mississippi Power & Light Co., the Court found that federal law preempted “a state inquiry into the reasonableness of FERC-approved process for the
sale of nuclear power to wholesalers of electricity.” Id. (citing Miss. Power & Light
Co., 487 U.S. at 373-77). Therefore, the ONEOK Court found it to be a conflict
preemption case. See id. (citing Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 377). The
Court further stated that the regulation at issue in Mississippi Power & Light Co.
involved a state regulation directly targeting sales under federal jurisdiction. See id.
at 1602. Moreover, Louisiana Power & Light Co. involved a federal law giving the
federal government “the authority to allocate natural gas during shortages by ordering interstate pipelines to curtail gas deliveries to all customers, including retail
customers.” Id. (emphasis in original). The ONEOK Court stated, however, that
“[t]he Court’s finding of pre-emption in Louisiana Power rested on its belief that
the state laws in question conflicted with federal law.” Id. (emphasis in original).
129. See id. at 1602 (rejecting cases asserted by petitioners). The Court decided that “[b]ecause petitioners have not argued this case as a conflict pre-emption case, Louisiana Power [and Mississippi Power] do[ ] not offer them significant
help.” Id.
130. See id. (leaving question of law to lower courts). The Court held that
“[t]o the extent any conflicts arise between state antitrust law proceedings and the
federal rate-setting process, the doctrine of conflict pre-emption should prove sufficient to address them.” Id.
131. See id. (refusing deference to FERC).
132. See id. (stating FERC never claimed that NGA preempted state law
claims).
133. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1602 (affirming decision by Ninth Circuit).
134. See id. at 1603 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating grounds for concurring
in judgment). According to Justice Thomas, “I write separately to reiterate my view
that ‘implied pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text are
inconsistent with the Constitution.’ ” Id. (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
583 (2009)) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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in the Constitution.135 Therefore, Justice Thomas expressed
doubts about the Supreme Court precedent holding state law to be
implicitly preempted in some instances.136 Because this precedent
was not challenged in ONEOK, however, Justice Thomas agreed
with the majority’s decision.137
C. Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion
The late Justice Antonin Scalia, joined in his dissent by Chief
Justice Roberts, expressed great concern over the majority’s ruling
and its impact on the interpretation of the NGA.138 Unlike the majority, Justice Scalia emphasized maintaining state authority under
the NGA to a lesser extent.139 According to Justice Scalia, the NGA
was passed to keep the state and federal governments within their
own spheres of regulatory authority, with a sharp and distinct line
separating those spheres.140
Justice Scalia sharply disagreed with the majority’s “target” test
for finding preemption.141 Unlike the majority’s test, Justice Scalia
stated that the test for finding preemption was “whether the matter
on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by
the Federal Act.”142 Under the dissent’s test, because the NGA
gives FERC the power to regulate activity affecting wholesale rates,

135. See id. at 1602 (stating only way federal law can preempt state law). “The
Supremacy Clause of our Constitution ‘gives ‘supreme’ status only to those [federal laws] that are ‘made in pursuance’ of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 585).
136. See id. (noting disagreement with Supreme Court precedent).
137. See id. (stating there was no challenge against Court’s precedent regarding NGA’s preemptive scope). Justice Thomas joined the entirety of the majority’s
opinion, except for Part I-A, where the majority discussed the different types of
preemption. Id.
138. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1603 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating grave worries with majority’s approach). Justice Scalia expressed concern, stating “[t]he
Court’s make-it-up-as-you-go-along approach to preemption has no basis in the
Act, contradicts our cases, and will prove unworkable in practice.” Id.
139. For a discussion of the majority’s emphasis on maintaining state authority, see supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
140. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1603 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating NGA distinctly separates federal and state authority). Justice Scalia argued, “[t]he Act and
our cases interpreting it draw a firm line between national and local authority over
this trade: If the Federal Government may regulate a subject, the States may not.
Today the Court smudges that line.” Id.
141. For a discussion of the test used by Justice Breyer in the majority opinion, see supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
142. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Schneidewind,
485 U.S. at 310 n.13) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating “proper” test for
field preemption).
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and because the litigation involved practices also affecting wholesale rates, federal law preempted the state antitrust claims.143
Justice Scalia also challenged the majority’s test for not being
as strict as precedent required.144 In Justice Scalia’s view, the NGA
was meant to distinguish federal and state authority in a clear and
distinct manner, rather than lead courts to make varying case-bycase determinations.145 According to the dissent, the majority also
erred because it failed to point to a single instance “in which we
have sustained state regulation of behavior already regulated by
[FERC].”146
In addition, Justice Scalia noted that the NGA “does not give
[FERC] the power to aim at particular effects; it gives it the power
to regulate particular activities.”147 According to Justice Scalia,
FERC can consider effects on the entire natural gas industry when
it exercises its authority, rather than just on interstate sales.148 The
federal government, therefore, can exercise its authority even if it
impacts areas left to the state, but the state cannot regulate areas
impacting the federal government’s jurisdiction.149
Further, Justice Scalia criticized the Court’s analysis of Northern
Natural Gas Co. and Northwest Central Pipeline Corp.150 In Northern
143. See id. (noting why NGA preempts state antitrust claims).
144. See id. at 1607 (arguing majority applied improper test for field
preemption).
145. See id. (stating precedent supports existence of clear test as opposed to
making case-by-case determinations).
“We have said before that ‘Congress meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained,
between state and federal jurisdiction’ over the gas trade. Our decisions have
therefore ‘squarely rejected’ the theory, endorsed by the Court today, that the
boundary between national and local authority turns on ‘a case-by-case analysis of
the impact of state regulation upon the national interest.’ ”
Id. (quoting Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id. at 1605 (attacking majority’s lack of precedent).
147. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). (stating what NGA
gives FERC power to regulate).
148. See id. (delineating scope of FERC’s powers). Justice Scalia gave two examples where FERC regulated wholesale rates with the intention of impacting an
area left to the regulation of the states: first, when FERC sets wholesale rates in
order to encourage conservation, and second, when FERC regulates wholesale
transactions in order to “blunt[ ] the sales’ anticompetitive effects in the retail
market.” Id. (citing Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 581,
602-03 (1945); Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 324 U.S. at 609-10 (Jackson, J., concurring);
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 276-80 (1976)).
149. See id. (noting that federal government has broader authority than state
governments). “It is not at all unusual for an activity controlled by [ ] [FERC] to
have effects in the States’ field; production, wholesale, and retail are[,] after all[,]
interdependent stages of a single trade.” Id. at 1606.
150. For a discussion on how the Court used these two cases, see supra notes
112-114 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol27/iss2/7

18

Torres: ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.: The Supreme Court Narrows the Preem

2016]

THE SUPREME COURT NARROWS

379

Natural Gas Co., Justice Scalia noted that the state regulations were
similar to the state antitrust claims in ONEOK.151 Justice Scalia further argued that, in Northwest Central Pipeline Corp., the test was not
why the state was regulating certain practices, but what the state was
regulating.152 While the states can regulate antitrust activity, Justice
Scalia noted that states do not exclusively exercise that power; the
state antitrust claims, therefore, cannot stand merely because of
states’ long history of regulating that activity.153
Justice Scalia also criticized the Court’s focus on state power,
and argued that while the NGA was not passed to remove state
power, “no law pursues its purposes at all costs.”154 Justice Scalia
noted that the purpose of the NGA was to pass uniform regulations,
and its purpose would be diluted if state claims were allowed to
regulate where the federal government already has authority.155 In
sum, “the Court’s decision will invite state antitrust courts to engage
in targeted regulation of the natural-gas industry.”156
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The conflicting opinions of Justices Breyer and Scalia in
ONEOK ultimately result from their different tests for determining
the NGA’s preemptive scope.157 In order to properly assess the
opinions, it is important to understand both tests in relation to the
151. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1606 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting similarities
between regulations at issue in Northern Natural Gas Co. and ONEOK). Justice Scalia
noted that both regulations at issue involved background practices and that, unlike
the majority in ONEOK, the Court in Northern Natural Gas Co. disregarded those
practices and held the state regulation to be preempted because it “invade[d] the
federal agency’s exclusive domain.” Id. (quoting N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp.
Comm’n of Kan., 372 U.S. 84, 92 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. See id. (explaining proper test under Northwest Central Pipeline Corp.).
“On this occasion the Court upheld the regulations—not because the law aimed at
the objective of gas conservation, but because the State pursued this end by regulating ‘the physical ac[t] of drawing gas from the earth[ ]’[.]” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489
U.S. 493, 510 (1989)).
153. See id. at 1607 (rebutting Court’s claim that state claims are not preempted because of history of antitrust regulation). The Natural Gas Act prohibits
states from fixing gas wholesale prices despite their authority to regulate public
utilities. Id. (citing Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S.
456, 468 (1943)).
154. Id. at 1608 (emphasis added) (stating limits of state authority under
NGA).
155. See id. (noting additional and more important purpose of NGA).
156. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing negative
consequences of Court’s decision).
157. For a discussion of Justice Breyer’s test, see supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s test, see supra note 142 and
accompanying text.
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Court’s preemption precedent.158 Further, it is important to analyze the extent that the NGA protects state authority over the natural gas industry.159 This examination is difficult, however, because
the natural gas industry extends past state lines, and thus blurs the
line between federal and state authority.160 If this line is clear, it
requires determining whether that clear and distinct line is advantageous to the federal or the state governments.161
A critical analysis of ONEOK shows that the majority’s test and
its conclusions are inconsistent with precedent, potentially having a
damaging impact on the natural gas industry.162 In the majority
opinion, Justice Breyer’s test for field preemption is inconsistent
with the Court’s precedent regarding preemption under the NGA
and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.163
For instance, the primary cases relied on by the Court focused on
whether the states invaded federal jurisdiction by regulating what
the NGA expressly provided to the federal government, not what
the state was seeking to accomplish.164 The Supremacy Clause’s ap158. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s precedent interpreting the preemptive scope of the NGA, see supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
159. For a discussion of how Justice Breyer treats state authority in light of the
NGA, see supra note 106 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how Justice
Scalia responded to Justice Breyer’s interpretation, see supra notes 154-155 and
accompanying text.
160. For a discussion of the blurry line between federal and state authority,
see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion on whether the federal government’s or state government’s authority is stronger, see infra notes 183-188 and accompanying text.
162. For a discussion on the impact of the Court’s holding, see infra text accompanying notes 188-212.
163. See ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1602-03 (2015) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (stating majority’s opinion is inconsistent with Supremacy Clause,
NGA, and precedent).
164. See N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 94 (1963)
(distinguishing regulations aimed at interstate purchasers and those aimed at production). While Justice Breyer bases his test on the use of “directly aiming” in
ONEOK, the Court’s opinion in Northern Natural Gas Co. does not focus on what the
state is attempting to accomplish through its regulatory scheme, but rather what it
is actually regulating. See id. at 89. The Court in Northern Natural Gas Co. found
that the state law was preempted because it “invade[d] the exclusive jurisdiction
which the Natural Gas Act has conferred upon [ ] [FPC] over the sale and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale.” Id. Therefore, the
Court’s decision was not based on the state’s aim, but the fact that it interfered
with the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction. Id. Further, the state regulation at issue in Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. was upheld not because it was aimed
at retail rates, but because it was “a regulation of ‘production or gathering’ within
Kansas’ power under the NGA.” Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n,
489 U.S. 493, 513 (1989). Therefore, both of these heavily relied upon cases based
their decisions on what the states regulated, rather than why they pursued regulation. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1606 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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plication does not rest on why the state regulates certain activity but
rather what the state is actually regulating.165
Under Justice Breyer’s test, states may pursue otherwise unconstitutional regulations merely by stating that the regulation is aimed
at fixing impacts of natural gas sales on the state.166 Further, in the
context of antitrust cases, such as those at the center of ONEOK, the
shifting test established by Justice Breyer would conceivably allow
litigants to avoid unfavorable federal courts by stating that their
claims are simply targeting state jurisdictional matters.167 Giving
states and litigants these opportunities would water down the
Supremacy Clause and usurp the federal government’s enumerated
power under the NGA.168
On the other hand, Justice Scalia’s test is more consistent with
the Supremacy Clause and with field preemption.169 The NGA was
passed to separate authority over the natural gas industry between
the federal and state government.170 Justice Scalia’s test, therefore,
ensures that state governments may regulate within their own
spheres of jurisdiction.171 Of course, the practices at issue affected
rates on the state level, but as Justice Scalia points out, the federal
165. See Nw. Cent., 489 U.S. at 510 (upholding state regulation because it regulated “[ ] physical act[ ] of drawing gas from [ ] earth[,]” which is within states’
authority); see also Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 310 n.13
(1988) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)) (upholding state regulation).
166. See Emily Hammond, ONEOK v. Learjet, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET
(OCT. TERM 2014) (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.gwlr.org/ONEOK-v-learjet/ (stating majority’s test is “malleable” and “puts immense pressure on how [ ] activity is
characterized[ ]”).
167. See id. (expressing displeasure with Court’s test). The background of
ONEOK differs from previous NGA preemption cases, however, because it does not
involve state laws directly regulating the natural gas industry. See, e.g., N. Natural
Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 88-89 (involving state measure to require pipeline to purchase
natural gas from state wells). Because ONEOK pertained to civil litigants, rather
than the state itself, it extends a lot of power to private individuals implementing
state laws in court. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
majority’s holding will give too much power to state courts).
168. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s criticism of the majority’s holding, see
supra text accompanying notes 138-156.
169. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s preemption test, see supra note 142
and accompanying text.
170. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 467
(1943) (stating federal and state governments are to operate on their own spheres
under NGA).
171. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s test, see supra note 142 and accompanying text. As Justice Scalia points out, the NGA gives FERC the power to regulate
practices affecting wholesale rates. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 717(d) (2012)). Therefore, states may not also regulate
practices affecting wholesale rates. Id.
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government has more latitude in what it can regulate.172 Unlike
the majority’s test, which blurs the line of authority established by
the NGA, Justice Scalia’s test results in more consistent and accurate determinations required by the Supremacy Clause and the
NGA.173
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion was also consistent with the
legislative purpose of the NGA.174 For example, he was correct in
stating that, while the NGA was not passed with the intention of
diminishing state authority, it was not meant to carry out that purpose at the expense of federal authority.175 Justice Breyer placed
great emphasis on this purpose, yet ignored the purpose of establishing uniform regulation of the natural gas industry.176 Inconsistent regulation of the interstate sale and transportation is a more
likely result of the Court’s overemphasis on state authority.177 A
lack of uniform regulation, in turn, can have grave consequences
regarding the interstate transportation and sale of natural gas.178
By leaving the authority to the lower courts to decide conflict
preemption issues, the majority opinion allows potential problems
stemming from the ONEOK holding to be prevented through other
avenues.179 While the majority appeared positive about how conflict preemption may address this issue, Justice Scalia was not as op-

172. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating it is not
unusual for FERC regulations to be upheld even if they have effects on states’
field).
173. See N. Natural Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 92 (declaring Court must “assure [ ]
effectuation of [ ] comprehensive federal regulation ordained by Congress[ ]”).
174. For a discussion of the legislative purpose of the NGA, see supra notes 5761 and accompanying text.
175. For a discussion of how Justice Scalia responds to the majority’s contention that the NGA was not passed to usurp state authority, see supra notes 154-155
and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the other purposes of the
NGA, see supra note 155 and accompanying text. According to Justice Scalia,
“nothing in the Act[ ] suggests that federal authority over practices is a secondclass power, somehow less exclusive than the authority over rates.” ONEOK, 135 S.
Ct. at 1605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 63335 (1972) (emphasizing need for uniform federal regulation under NGA); N. Natural Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 91 (declaring one of NGA’s primary purposes is to create
uniform federal regulation of natural gas industry).
178. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s view of how the majority’s holding will
impact the natural gas industry, see supra text accompanying note 156. For a discussion of ONEOK’s impact on the natural gas industry, see infra text accompanying notes 188-212.
179. For an explanation of the reasoning behind leaving preemption decisions to lower court, see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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timistic.180 It is questionable, therefore, whether lower courts can
maintain uniformity over the natural gas industry via conflict preemption after the Court’s unclear interpretation of the NGA’s preemptive scope.181
ONEOK ultimately brings to head the issue of determining the
clarity of the division between state and federal authority, and
namely, who has the greater authority under that division.182 If this
dividing line is easily distinguishable, then issues such as the one in
ONEOK should not be decided on a case-by-case basis, as the Supreme Court’s holding asserted.183 The NGA was passed to allow
the federal government to regulate where the states could not: the
interstate transportation and sale of natural gas.184 The NGA
granted jurisdiction to the federal government over interstate sales
and reserved to states only what is within their borders, thus signaling intent for a clear distinction of authority.185 Further, the Constitution expressly gives the federal government superior status in
areas where it regulates.186 The Supreme Court’s holding that the
NGA did not preempt the state antitrust claims, therefore, is not
consistent with precedent because the claims essentially regulated
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.187
VI. IMPACT
Although ONEOK did not initially draw as much attention as
other Supreme Court decisions during the October 2014 term, it
180. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating reservations
that conflict preemption will address preemption issue). “Conflict preemption will
resolve only discrepancies between state and federal regulations, not the discrepancies among differing state regulations to which today’s opinion subjects the industry.” Id.
181. For a discussion of ONEOK’s impact on natural gas regulation, see infra
text accompanying notes 188-212.
182. Compare ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1601 (stating there is no clear dividing line
between federal and state authority over natural gas industry), with id. at 1604
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating NGA was passed with intent to maintain clear division of federal and state authority).
183. See id. at 1607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Nantahala Power & Light
Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986)) (arguing precedent rejects case-bycase analysis of preemption issues under NGA).
184. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 717(b) (West 2015) (giving FERC exclusive jurisdiction
over interstate transportation and sale of natural gas).
185. See Nantahala Power & Light Co., 476 U.S. at 966 (holding Congress intended clear distinction between federal and state jurisdiction).
186. For a discussion of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, see supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
187. See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1988)) (stating state
law is preempted if it regulates what is being regulated by FERC).
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will bring major regulatory consequences to the natural gas industry.188 First, the decision impacts the state’s authority over the natural gas industry.189 Second, the Court’s holding can potentially
increase the flexibility of state legislatures to regulate the natural
gas industry.190 The Court’s holding, however, leaves a potential
avenue for interstate pipelines to challenge state regulation.191
Third, ONEOK may impact the interpretation of the preemptive
scope of similar federal statutes.192
Primarily, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion provides states with
greater latitude in regulating interstate pipeline companies.193
Even more so, it allows private litigants seeking damages from interstate pipelines to successfully bring state antitrust claims.194 The
filing of these claims is possible even if the alleged actions on the
part of interstate pipelines have an effect on wholesale rates for natural gas.195 The caveat, pursuant to Justice Breyer’s test, however, is
that the claims brought must target the effect on retail rates.196 Litigants bringing state antitrust claims can easily satisfy this test.197
For example, an attorney for a retail purchaser of natural gas would
only have to claim that the wholesale seller negatively impacted the
rate of natural gas to the retail seller, even though those same actions had consequences on wholesale rates of natural gas.198 Justice
Breyer’s flexible test may not only have ramifications on interstate
188. See Jim Rossi, Opinion Analysis: Scaling Back Federal Preemption in the Energy
Markets, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 22, 2015, 12:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2015/04/opinion-analysis-scaling-back-federal-preemption-in-energy-markets/
(analyzing Court’s opinion in ONEOK).
189. For a discussion of the state’s authority over the natural gas industry after
ONEOK, see infra text accompanying note 193-199.
190. For a discussion of how ONEOK may impact the authority of state legislatures, see infra text accompanying notes 200-204.
191. For a discussion of how future challenges to the bringing of state antitrust claims in the context of the natural gas industry can be brought, see infra text
accompanying notes 205-209.
192. For a discussion of future cases that may be impacted by ONEOK, see
infra note 210 and accompanying text.
193. For a discussion of how the majority’s holding will unduly strengthen the
authority of state courts, see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of potential claims brought by litigants, see supra notes
166-168 and accompanying text.
195. For a discussion of the underlying facts in ONEOK, see supra notes 15-39
and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of Justice Breyer’s test, see supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
197. For a discussion on the test’s effect on future challenges regarding state
antitrust claims, see supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
198. For a discussion of how this test will impact litigants, see supra notes 166168 and accompanying text.
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pipelines that sell directly to consumers, but also on wholesale rates
which will likely be impacted by the consequences of private litigation against interstate pipelines.199
The overall impact of ONEOK also depends on whether it is
limited to state laws providing causes of action, or if it also applies
to direct regulatory measures made by states, which the Court does
not address.200 If it does apply to direct regulatory measures, it
would give state legislators more latitude in regulating natural gas
sales within their states.201 After ONEOK, state legislatures would be
free to regulate practices impacting retail transactions, even if the
same practices impact wholesale transactions.202 As Justice Scalia
pointed out, however, precedent would not allow this because it
would involve the state impermissibly invading a field being regulated by the federal government.203 Regardless of whether the
opinion stretches to the legislatures or is limited to state or federal
courts deciding state law claims, ONEOK provides greater leeway in
how states can regulate the natural gas industry.204
Justice Breyer’s opinion was certainly narrow in terms of limiting review solely to field preemption as opposed to conflict preemption.205 By leaving it to the lower courts to decide the question of
conflict preemption, the Court puts litigants, particularly interstate
pipelines, on notice that they may challenge state law claims because they conflict with federal regulation.206 A pipeline defendant
would only need to show that the effect of state law claims on practices affecting both retail and wholesale rates of natural gas con-

199. For a discussion of how ONEOK affects private litigation in the natural
gas industry, see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
200. ONEOK involved state antitrust causes of action, rather than direct regulation of the state. For a discussion of the facts in ONEOK, see supra notes 15-39
and accompanying text.
201. For a discussion of Justice Breyer’s test, see supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text. For a discussion of this test’s impact, see supra notes 193-195 and
accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of how state antitrust claims were allowed to move on
despite alleged activities having an impact on wholesale and retail rates, see supra
text accompanying notes 15-39.
203. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s test and how he would apply it, see
supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
204. For a discussion of how states can regulate the natural gas industry, see
supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion of Justice Breyer’s analysis, see supra notes 100-102 and
accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of conflict preemption, see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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flicts with federal regulation of wholesale rates.207 The Court’s
holding in ONEOK also creates a possibility for state law claims to
clash with federal authority over wholesale rates.208 Interstate pipelines, therefore, have an additional avenue to successfully establish
that the Natural Gas Act may preempt state law claims.209
Lastly, the ONEOK decision has a major impact on imminent
litigation regarding the preemptive scope of the Federal Power Act
(FPA), a federal energy statute that shares many structural similarities with the NGA.210 Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in
ONEOK has an increased potential to have spillover effects on the
industries regulated under the FPA.211 The greatest impact ONEOK
has, however, is that it allows for the concurrent, rather than exclusive, regulation of the natural gas industry.212
Alexander D. Torres*

207. For a discussion of the impact of conflict preemption on future litigants,
see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
208. For a discussion of how ONEOK increases state authority over the natural
gas industry, see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
209. Because the NGA does not explicitly say that it preempts state law in
instances where wholesale rates are affected, express preemption does not apply.
For a discussion of express preemption, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
210. See Rossi, supra note 188 (discussing ONEOK’s impact on other preemption cases involving FPA for Court’s 2015 term). There are three cases slated for
the October 2015 Term that involve FERC’s authority under the FPA: Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association, EnerNOC v. Electric Power
Supply Association, and Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing. See October Term 2015,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2015/ (last visited
Jan. 5, 2016).
211. For an analysis of the Court’s opinion, see supra notes 157-187 and accompanying text. In addition, the Court’s holding can potentially impact how
courts examine the Supremacy Clause and its tolerance for concurrent regulation.
For a discussion of the Supremacy Clause and preemption, see supra notes 43-54
and accompanying text.
212. For a discussion of the majority’s opinion in ONEOK, see supra notes 100133 and accompanying text. By allowing the state antitrust claims to stand despite
the activities impact on wholesale rates, the Court leaves it open to both FERC and
state courts to regulate activities that have an impact on wholesale rates. See
ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1607 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(predicting negative impact of allowing state courts to address issues within federal
jurisdiction).
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2014, DeSales University.
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